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Easy to use, interactive web applications 
accumulating data from heterogeneous sources 
represent a recent trend on the World Wide Web, 
referred to as the Social Web. There however, security 
standards are often disregarded in favor of interface 
design or brand new features. This prevents the new 
services from gaining ground in the enterprise, in 
medical or e-government environments. We propose 
the deployment of XML Digital Signatures on web 
content and demonstrate how an architecture enabling 
for various security properties would look like. The 
solution proposed will benefit from the research on 
security engineering in Service-Oriented Architectures 
and thus allows for an in-depth analysis on the results. 
1. Introduction 
Very often in the history of computing, solutions 
intended for a small audience only were opened to a 
large user base and encountered new challenges or 
threats. Before web sites started exchanging infor-
mation without user action, every site was assumed to 
have a small number of editors only. Hence, it was 
sufficient to include the site’s identity in the security 
measures leading to transport layer security (TLS) 
protection [15]. Besides the fact that this type of 
identity information does not prevent attackers from 
modifying content on the web server, the model does 
not fit well in situations in which the relation of a web 
site and the individuals creating content for that site is 
unclear. With the recent advent of user generated con-
tent and syndication, existing security standards for the 
World Wide Web (WWW) do not protect against the 
new security threats. 
Site owners may not want to guarantee the 
correctness of information displayed on their site in 
good faith anymore. We propose protecting the inte-
grity of the information itself, not only its trans-
portation. To achieve this goal, we incorporate XML 
Signatures [10] on web content. Building completely 
upon existing standards, the architecture we propose is 
very easy to adopt and does not interfere with existing 
tools. Besides enabling all participants in a security-
enabled infrastructure for analysis on the security 
properties of the information processed, even new 
applications can be built on top of this architecture. 
Among them are new filter mechanisms, authorization 
methods and larger security architectures suitable for 
environments with rigid legal constraints [14]. 
The paper is organized as follows. The recent 
technologies found on the WWW are introduced in 
Section 2. In Section 3, the general IT security objec-
tives are outlined including how they are met in the 
existing WWW and why the Social Web introduces 
new challenges in that area. Our architecture guaran-
teeing integrity protection for the Social Web is pre-
sented in Section 4. Finally, Section 5 relates our 
approach to the current state of the art and Section 6 
gives an outlook on future work.  
2. Recent trends on the WWW 
Many aspects of recent technology in the WWW 
are referred to as Social Web or more popular as Web 
2.0 [12]. We categorize the different web sites by their 
most notable features. Most of the web sites are 
content-oriented, designed for publication, storage, ag-
gregation, and syndication of information. The majo-
rity of content on the Social Web is made of text—be it 
created in various blog posts, wiki pages, or comments 
on various types of resources like photos or videos. 
While text content is mainly distributed over myriad 
web sites, the number of web sites offering photo or 
video storage—usually organized as huge portals—is 
much smaller. The content discussed so far is usually 
being referred to as user generated or user driven 
content. 
The reuse of data on remote sites is another main 
feature of the Social Web: aggregation and the set up 
of composite applications, which are also known as 
mash-ups. Most sites on the Social Web syndicate their 
content with Really Simple Syndication (RSS) or 
ATOM feeds. Obviously the quality of the processed 
information heavily depends on the good nature of all 
participants. 
Besides this, the Social Web features community 
sites offering user profiles. Those might act as identity 
providers using e.g. OpenID [11]. Also, many Social 
Web sites are realized as Rich Internet Applications 
[6], offering intuitive and desktop-like user interfaces. 
Finally, many web sites on the Social Web allow users 
to annotate resources—articles, pictures, videos, or 
user profiles of other participants—and are referred to 
as Social Tagging Systems.  
3. Objectives of IT security 
There are three superordinate security objectives: 
confidentiality, integrity, and availability [16]. There is 
no common way to support these objectives in HTML. 
Up to now, they are partially achieved by protecting 
the Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) transport with 
TLS tunnelling (HTTPS). However, this kind of 
protection is only sufficient if the information being 
transported is strongly related to the particular web 
site. This holds true e.g. for online banking or shopping 
sites. On the contrary, web sites aggregating informa-
tion from various other sites cannot “preserve” this 
type of protection.  
Voices in the Social Web often refer to openness, 
self-regulation and simplicity of technologies. This 
approach allows for rapid creation of new services. But 
to bring these services to the enterprise and other do-
mains with strict legal constraints, it requires a trust 
framework for the Social Web, focusing on the new 
layer of abstraction originating from the WWW’s 
development from an application itself to a platform 
for various applications, which actually form the Social 
Web. 
As one of the main characteristics of the Social 
Web is the user generated content paradigm, the 
security objectives can hardly be achieved in a site-
centric manner [2]. Instead, confidentiality, integrity 
and availability must be bound directly to the informa-
tion created by users [14].  
3.1. Confidentiality and availability 
Protecting information from unauthorized disclo-
sure contradicts the openness of the Social Web; strong 
links between different sites turn management of confi-
dential information within the Social Web in a hassle.  
Yet there are clear scenarios requiring authori-
zation. Wikis e.g. require access control solutions hard 
to build upon traditional web sites’ authorization mo-
dels. Community-driven encyclopaedia sites need 
authorization models totally different from that of a 
project management sites restricted to a well-defined 
number of participants.  
Ensuring availability of information could also be a 
new feature of the Social Web. Through syndication, 
content will be available even if the original resource is 
not available for any reason.  
3.2. Integrity 
Many Social Web sites collect and aggregate 
information from other sites and add value to the 
underlying information. These web sites are just 
responsible for the added value, not for the underlying 
content. This situation requires for a new solution 
regarding the protection of the integrity and authen-
tication of information. 
Hence, digital signatures, which are commonly 
used for integrity protection and authentication [16], 
have to be combined with the information found on the 
Social Web. Note that there are various types of enti-
ties: text, image, audio and video content, URIs poin-
ting to other resources, and tags used for annotation of 
the former. In the Section 4 we propose an architecture 
for the protection of textual information. The architec-
ture can then be extended to enable protection of the 
aforementioned several types of information. 
Consider e.g. a scenario where several sites intro-
duce content into the system, other sites subscribe to 
these sites to aggregate, filter, or combine information, 
and several end users subscribe to any of those sites. In 
a traditional web environment, any of the participants 
could introduce forged information into the system. 
While this might be detected in a huge community, for 
a smaller group of people this could be a serious threat. 
If on the other hand the sites introducing new content 
into the system protect their information using digital 
signatures, none of the other participants could do 
anything except trying to conceal large pieces of infor-
mation from their audiences. 
3.3. Further security objectives 
There are some other security objectives for the 
Social Web that either can be related to one of the three 
aforementioned security objectives (confidentiality, 
availability, and integrity) [16], or to properties of 
identity management systems [3]. Accountability e.g. 
builds upon authentication and integrity.  
But for the democracy found in Social Web com-
munities, anonymity is important. There already exist 
cryptography-based anonymization technologies for e-
mail and web-browsing [5] that could be extended to 
support user generated content. Eventually, the security 
objectives that need to be mapped on the Social Web 
technologies will also include service protection, 
content revocation, and privacy policies [3]. 
4. A signature-based architecture for 
trusted content on the Social Web 
As outlined in the previous section, our proposal 
focuses on integrity protection and authentication of 
text-based web content. This approach helps to under-
stand the unique security requirements for Social Web 
applications. We use XML Signatures [10], which are 
quite common for integrity protection and authentica-
tion for structured data, to protect textual information. 
As most web browsers already support public key 
cryptography due to their TLS and Java support, our 
solution does not introduce much overhead to existing 
systems. The workflow induced by our architecture is 
outlined in figure 1. 
4.1. Prerequisites 
Accurate verification of digital signatures is not an 
easy task [16]. Users need to trust in the software and 
hardware computing hash values and comparing en-
crypted values. Also, data visible to the user must be 
displayed correctly. As an example, malicious CSS 
could insert or remove text from HTML documents, 
using “:before” and “:after” elements (fig. 2). Hence, 
signature verification involves serious user interaction. 
But also, the signing party needs to verify the informa-
tion being signed.  
Both Content Management Systems (CMS) and 
web browsers need to be extended allowing for 
storage, transport, and evaluation of digital signatures. 
CMS need the capability of accepting signed content 
from their authors. Also, they will have to pass on the 
signatures via their different interfaces like HTML, 
feeds and other formats for automated processing. 
4.2. XML Signature for XHTML content 
The architecture we are proposing uses XHTML 
1.1 modules [8] to embed XML Signatures in XHTML 
conforming documents. That way, the architecture is 
also suitable for the upcoming XHTML 2.0 standard 
[1]. Embedding XHTML in ATOM requires all 
XHTML content to reside in a single <div> element. 
Hence, it is wise to sign <div> elements or content 
within <div> elements. That way the signed XHTML 
can be published in ATOM feeds (fig. 3). 
Being quite valuable information in a sender/reci-
pient scenario, the full consequences of integrity pro-
Figure 2. Forgery of web content by CSS
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 <p> Lorem <strong>ipsum</strong> dolor sit …</p> 
 <Signature xmlns="http://.../xmldsig#"> 
  <SignedInfo> 
   <Reference URI="#my_message"> 
   … 
 </Signature>  
</div>
Figure 3. XML Signatures in XHTML
tection become clear in a more complex environment, 
where data from multiple sources are combined in a 
composite application. Now, data integrity can be veri-
fied by all participants for all information sources. Up 
to the present using HTTPS only, participants were 
only able to verify the information of their direct 
inputs.  
When it comes to HTML signing, it is questionable 
whether to sign presentation-related information along 
with the HTML code. E.g., if formatting is achieved 
with CSS classes, class names are surely bound to a 
site’s layout. Hence, we suggest using a transform 
when creating the signature that removes the class 
attributes from the HTML code. Second, as the id 
attributes are necessary for the references within the 
XML Signature, they need to remain the same in all 
HTML documents they occur. As a consequence, id 
attribute values need to be assigned in a collision-
avoiding manner. Also, for each hyperlink embedded 
in signed HTML, the decision whether to use relative 
or absolute URIs depends on the further use of the 
given piece of HTML. 
4.3. Prototype implementation 
We implemented an extension for Mozilla Firefox 
and a plug-in for the WordPress blogging engine. The 
Firefox extension analyzes web pages during load and 
signals the presence of signed content. (fig. 4). 
To verify the content, users have to click on the 
icon in the status bar. From a menu showing sum-
maries of each item equipped with a signature, users 
chose which part to view. In a separate dialog window 
the representation and the signature details are dis-
played. By viewing the content in a separate window, 
no web page can pretend to contain some signed 
information that is not really signed. 
We kept our plug-in for the WordPress blogging 
engine very simple at this time. It just offers the 
possibility to pass a block of signed XHTML along 
with a blog post. When the respective article is viewed 
on the blog’s web site, the signature itself is not visible 
in the browser window but is evaluated by our plug-in. 
The signatures are created outside from WordPress 
using a small desktop application we implemented as a 
prototype.  
5. Related work 
The idea of signing information using public key 
approaches is not new. Also, very much thought went 
into various standards securing SOAP Web Services. 
Compared to that, very little has been done around the 
technologies on the WWW. In [13], Pöhls proposed 
embedding digital signatures using microformats simi-
lar to XML Signatures into HTML in order to sign 
parts of web sites. His approach is strongly tied to 
HTML by the focus on microformats. For true inter-
operability, a more generic approach basing on accep-
ted standards is vital, but is not considered in detail. In 
contrast, our approach just builds upon mature XML 
Signatures. By doing so, our solution is way more open 
to reuse of data on different communication channels 
like XMLRPC or SOAP. It is even possible to mimic 
the signing of microformats or RDFa data with the 
help of transforms during the signature creation 
process without introducing any non-standard 
elements. 
Besides the use case presented throughout the paper 
we see a strong connection to the research on security 
engineering in the Service Oriented Architecture. 
Although web-based services like mash-ups are conce-
ded requiring much less operating expense compared 
to more complex SOAP-based infrastructures, much of 
the reduced complexity originates from avoiding any 
security architecture. While those promoting web-
based, or ReST-based [4], services claim that HTTPS 
helps fulfilling sufficient security properties, we would 
rather refer to the indeed complex security 
considerations around OASIS’ SOA Reference Model 
[7], [9]. Hence, we contribute to the security of the 
ReST architecture model and to the research on its 
security properties.  
Also, our work is related to user-centric identity 
management solutions [3]. User centricity led to new 
approaches on identity management [11]. Our work 
strongly relies on the development in the area of Public 
Key Infrastructures (PKI). Furthermore, it reveals the 
actual impact a working wide-spread identity manage-
ment will have: The effect will be much more than just 
convenience as stated by different authors but instead 
will bring confidence, reliability and availability to 
various scenarios. 
Figure 4. A Firefox plug-in for 
XML Signature validation 
6. Conclusion and further research 
We have analyzed security requirements for web 
applications and identified the limitations of the securi-
ty measures taken in today’s web applications. As a 
simple yet standardized and easy-to-adopt solution for 
decentralized scenarios, we proposed the use of XML 
Signature in order to protect arbitrary pieces of 
XHTML content. Our implementation of a very simple 
yet sufficient plug-in for the WordPress blogging engi-
ne and for the Mozilla Firefox web browser analyzing 
and displaying signed content embedded in web pages 
showcases the feasibility and efficiency of our 
approach. Keeping the desire for simple solutions in 
mind, we are convinced that a security architecture 
based on existing standards will allow for new oppor-
tunities and even new business models tapping the full 
potential of fast-paced interconnected web applica-
tions. 
We have not yet defined how other data types like 
tags—which don’t have a canonical representation—
will be integrated in our solution. So, one goal is 
definitely to capture the whole world of web-based 
applications and integrate them in a homogenous yet 
simple solution. In parallel, we are also looking on 
policy and best practice aspects. Policies will become 
necessary if web sites want to connect the use of their 
content to some kind of authorization. Finally, an ex-
tension to the remaining security objectives with all the 
influence on the infrastructure is the main stream of re-
search in our project. Additional standardized techno-
logies and existing as well as upcoming identity mana-
gement solutions will form parts of further research. 
For all of those aspects there is one clear constraint: 
any solution on web security should pick up the easy 
feel of the Social Web sites, and thus allow for quick 
and mostly invisible adoption of security-enhancing 
technologies in that area. 
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